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Abstract
The aviation industry accounts for more than 2% of global CO2 emissions. Biojet fuel 
is expected to make an essential contribution to the decarbonization of the aviation 
sector. Brazil is seen as a key player in developing sustainable aviation biofuels 
owing to its long‐standing experience with biofuels. Nevertheless, a clear under-
standing of what policies may be conducive to the emergence of a biojet fuel supply 
chain is lacking. We extended a spatially explicit agent‐based model to explore the 
emergence of a biojet fuel supply chain from the existing sugarcane–ethanol supply 
chain. The model accounts for new policies (feed‐in tariff and capital investment 
subsidy) and new considerations into the decision making about production and in-
vestment in processing capacity. We found that in a tax‐free gasoline regime, a feed‐
in tariff above 3 R$/L stimulates the production of biojet fuel. At higher levels of 
gasoline taxation (i.e., 2.46 R$/L), however, any feed‐in tariff is insufficient to en-
sure the production of biojet fuel. Thus, at these levels of gasoline taxation, it is 
needed to introduce regulations on the production of biojet fuel to ensure its produc-
tion. Given the current debate about the future direction of the biofuel policy in 
Brazil, we recommend further research into the effect of market mechanisms based 
on greenhouse gas emissions on the emergence of a Brazilian biojet fuel supply 
chain.
K E Y W O R D S
agent‐based modeling, biofuel policies, biojet fuel, Brazil, policy analysis, supply chain
1 |  INTRODUCTION
The aviation industry accounts for more than 2% of global 
CO2 emissions (Cremonez et al., 2015). To reduce the envi-
ronmental impact of the aviation sector, the Air Transport 
Action Group (ATAG) has established goals to reach car-
bon neutral growth from 2020 and reduce net carbon di-
oxide emissions by 50% (relative to 2005 levels) by 2050 
(Group A.T.A., 2012). Unlike for the road transport sector, 
short‐term options to decarbonize the air transport sector 
are limited. Aviation will rely on liquid fuels with high en-
ergy density for decades to come (Group A.T.A., 2012). 
Biojet fuel is expected to make an essential contribution 
to the decarbonization of the aviation sector (Mawhood et 
al., 2016). Nevertheless, production volumes of biojet fuel 
have been negligible as demand remains low because of 
high prices (de Jong et al., 2015). The lack of competitive-
ness of biojet fuel as compared to jet kerosene is one of the 
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main factors hindering the emergence of biojet fuel supply 
chains.
Brazil is seen as a key player in developing sustainable 
aviation biofuels owing to its long‐standing experience with 
biofuels (Boeing, FAPESP & UNICAMP, 2013) and its 
increasing demand for jet fuel. Brazil is the world's sixth 
largest domestic aviation market (Oxley & Goodger, 2015).
Currently, Brazil consumes 6 M ton/year of jet fuels and it is 
projected that the required jet fuel amounts to over 20 M ton/
year in 2050 (Pashaei Kamali, Borges, Osseweijer, & Posada, 
2018). The research into the potential of up taking biofuel 
production in Brazil has mainly focused on availability of 
feedstocks (Cantarella, Nassar, Cortez, & Baldassin, 2015) 
and techno‐economic and environmental impact assess-
ments (Alves et al., 2017; Moreira, Gurgel, & Seabra, 2014). 
Although the Brazilian ethanol and biodiesel supply chains 
are a clear example of the benefits of long‐term policies on 
the development of the bioenergy sector (Alonso‐Pippo, 
Luengo, Alonsoamador Morales Alberteris, García del Pino, 
& Duvoisin, 2013), not much attention has been hitherto paid 
to the influence of policies on the emergence of biojet fuel 
supply chains.
1.1 | Literature review
A recent strand of literature has focused on the effect of pol-
icy instruments on the aviation sector's economic and envi-
ronmental performance. The most studied policy instruments 
include the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) (Anger, 
2010; Scheelhaase, Grimme, & Schaefer, 2010; Vespermann 
& Wald, 2011), the US federal aviation administration 
(Winchester, McConnachie, Wollersheim, & Waitz, 2013), 
and carbon pricing (Sgouridis, Bonnefoy, & Hansman, 2011).
In the analysis of the implications of including the aviation 
sector in the European emission trading scheme (EU ETS), 
Anger found that this policy has a negligible effect on the EU 
economy and leads to reductions in the CO2 emissions (Anger, 
2010), whereas Vespermann and Wald (2011) concluded that 
the air transport sector is unable to yield significant reduc-
tions of emissions under the EU ETS. Scheelhaase et al. 
(2010) found that including the aviation into the ETS would 
incentive airports to maximize their output in terms of RTK1 
in 2010 regardless of the emissions caused, and would have a 
moderate impact on the price increase.
To assess the impacts of the US Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) on the economic and environmental 
performance, Winchester et al. (2013) used an economy‐wide 
model coupled with a partial equilibrium model of the avi-
ation industry. The authors found that meeting the aviation 
biofuel target has a small impact on CO2 emissions and that 
it is an expensive abatement option relative to alternatives.
Sgouridis et al. (2011) developed the Global Aviation 
Industry Dynamics (GAID) model to assess the impact of 
five generic policies (i.e., (a) technological efficiency im-
provements, (b) operational efficiency improvements, (c) use 
of alternative fuels, (d) demand shift, and (e) carbon pricing) 
on the reduction of emissions of the aviation sector. The au-
thors found that improvements in the efficiency of technol-
ogy, use of biofuels, moderate levels of carbon pricing, and 
reduction in short‐ and medium‐haul travel are required for 
the transition of the aviation sector to sustainable mobility.
De Jong used a cost optimization model (RESolve‐
Biomass) to project the consumption of renewable jet fuel 
(RJF) in the EU and its environmental performance. The 
model accounts for the anticipated regulatory context in the 
EU (i.e., RED‐I, RED‐II proposal2, the EU Emission Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS), and the Global Offsetting and Reduction 
Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA)), competition 
for biomass from other bio‐based sectors, and the availability 
of biomass and conversion technologies. He found that a 1.2 
multiplier for RJF, (advanced) biofuel targets, and high prices 
of fossil jet fuel relative to other fossil fuels drive the intro-
duction of RJF in the EU. Nevertheless, a higher multiplier 
may lead to lower GHG emission reductions (de Jong, 2018).
These studies have focused on understanding the impact 
of certain policies on the aviation sector. As they used models 
that either assume the existence of static equilibria or assume 
that the dynamics of the system is governed by the predeter-
mined system structure, none of these studies explored the 
institutional conditions for the emergence of a biojet fuel sup-
ply chain.
The contribution of this work is to provide insights into 
the institutional conditions that might lead to the emergence 
of a biojet fuel supply chain from the existing Brazilian 
sugarcane–ethanol supply chain. The analysis focuses on 
the impact of institutions on actors’ decision making about 
production and consumption of biofuels. Thus, the spatially 
explicit agent‐based model that describes the Brazilian sug-
arcane–ethanol supply chain (Moncada et al., 2018) was ex-
tended to account for the processes and mechanisms that may 
lead to the emergence of a biojet fuel supply chain. The aim 
of the model is to answer the following research question: 
Under what institutional conditions (i.e., formal policies) 
may the biojet fuel supply chain emerge in Brazil in the pe-
riod 2015–2030?
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 
2 describes the conceptual framework that underpins the de-
velopment of the agent‐based model. Section 3 describes the 
results obtained which are discussed in section 4.
1Revenue tonne kilometers. 
2The RED‐II proposes a multiplier to incentivize the production of biofuels 
for the aviation and marine sectors. Renewable fuels supplied to these sec-
tors may count 1.2 times their energy contents toward the target. 
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2 |  MATERIALS AND METHODS
This section describes the concepts and modeling considera-
tions required for the potential emergence of a biojet fuel 
supply chain. We divided this section in four subsections. In 
the first subsection, we give a brief description of the 
Brazilian sugarcane–ethanol supply chain and argue why this 
supply chain can be used as a starting point for the emergence 
of a biojet fuel supply chain. Then, we describe how the bio-
jet fuel supply chain is conceptualized. In the third subsec-
tion, we describe the agent‐based model using the ODD 
protocol3 (Grimm et al., 2006). Finally, we describe how we 
modeled the policies that aim to incentivize the investment in 
and production of biojet fuel.
2.1 | System description
In this study, we use the Brazilian sugarcane–ethanol supply 
chain as a “seed” to “grow” a biojet fuel supply chain. The 
main actors in the sugarcane–ethanol supply chain are farm-
ers, mill owners, fuel suppliers, and drivers. This supply chain 
has been shaped by governmental support (e.g., ProAlcool 
program) and the introduction of technological innovations, 
such as flex plants and flex vehicles. Flex technology ena-
bles plants to produce flexible ratios of sugar and ethanol 
from sugarcane (McKay, Sauer, Richardson, & Herre, 2015). 
With regard to ethanol production, the plants can produce 
either hydrous ethanol (up to 4.9% v/v of water), or anhy-
drous ethanol (up to 0.4% v/v of water), or both. Similarly, 
the introduction of flex vehicles brought flexibility into the 
demand side of the supply chain. This demand consists of 
mostly flex vehicles and regular vehicles. Flex vehicles can 
be powered by E100 (hydrous ethanol), gasohol (a blend of 
gasoline and anhydrous ethanol, of which the max share of 
anhydrous ethanol is 27.5% v/v due to technical limitations 
of regular vehicles; Demczuk & Padula, 2017), or any mix 
between these two. Unlike flex vehicles, regular vehicles can 
be only powered by gasohol.
Institutional arrangements and policy instruments influ-
ence the behavior of the sugarcane–ethanol supply chain. 
One of the most important institutional arrangements is 
CONSECANA‐SP. This institutional arrangement reduces 
the uncertainty in the interaction between farmers and mill 
owners by determining the price of sugarcane. This price is 
determined by the amount of total recoverable sugar (TRS) 
in the sugarcane and the prices of sugar and ethanol on the 
domestic and foreign markets (Ferraz Dias de Moraes & 
Zilberman, 2014). On the other hand, policy instruments such 
as blending mandates (e.g., of anhydrous ethanol in gasohol) 
and taxes levied on hydrous ethanol, anhydrous ethanol, and 
gasoline influence the behavior of the supply chain by shap-
ing the patterns of production and consumption of ethanol.
One of the main factors hindering the production of biojet 
fuel is its lack of economic competitiveness as compared to 
fossil jet fuel (de Jong et al., 2015). The gap between the fos-
sil jet fuel price and the biojet fuel price could be reduced by 
using existing social and physical infrastructure. In this study, 
we use the social and physical infrastructure defining the sug-
arcane–ethanol supply chain to breed a biojet fuel supply for 
two main reasons. First, the existence of a well‐established 
agro‐industrial sector dedicated to the production of ethanol 
(Barbosa Cortez, 2014). Second, biojet fuel can be produced 
from ethanol through the route alcohol to jet fuel. This route 
involves four steps (see Figure 1): dehydration of ethanol, 
oligomerization of ethylene, distillation of wide spectrum 
hydrocarbon, and hydrogenation of the saturated hydrocar-
bon. Recently, ASTM approved a biojet fuel produced from 
isobutanol for commercial use in blends of a maximum level 
of 30% in kerosene (GreenAir, 2016).
The emergence of a biojet fuel supply chain in the 
Brazilian context requires the addition of new elements into 
the existing sugarcane–ethanol supply, such as actors (i.e., 
airports), technology (alcohol to jet fuel) and institutions, 
supporting the introduction of biojet fuel (e.g., feed‐in tariff 
and capital investment subsidy). The next section describes 
how the sugarcane–ethanol supply chain is conceptualized 
and formalized into a computational model, and how the 
aforementioned elements are added to this formalization.
2.2 | Conceptual framework
A system diagram of the Brazilian biojet fuel supply chain is 
presented in Figure 24. The system is analyzed from the hy-
pothetical viewpoint of the Brazilian government. This per-
spective is characterized by a government that aims to use the 
existing sugarcane–ethanol supply chain as a substrate for the 
emergence of a biojet fuel supply chain. The government's 
policy instruments are a capital investment subsidy and a 
feed‐in tariff. We use these supply‐side policies because bio-
jet fuel is in an early phase of introduction to the market, and 
thus, it is necessary to reduce the risk aversion of potential 
investors (Agency I.E., 2010). It is assumed that the behavior 
of the system is shaped by the external factors depicted in 
Figure 2.
Complex adaptive systems theory is used for the analysis 
of the phenomenon of the emergence of a Brazilian biojet 
fuel supply chain from the existing sugarcane–ethanol supply 
3The Overview, Design concepts, and Details (ODD) protocol is a method 
used to describe agent‐based models. This protocol was developed by 
Grimm et al. (2006). 
4The scope of the capital investment subsidy and feed‐in tariff is limited to 
incentivize the production of biojet fuel to satisfy domestic demand, for it is 
unlikely that national governments will subsidize biojet fuel for international 
flights. 
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chain. This supply chain is considered as a complex adap-
tive system. This system consists of heterogeneous actors 
(farmers, sugar/ethanol producers) who constantly adapt 
their behavior (e.g., decision making about production and 
consumption of biofuels) in response to other actors’ behav-
ior and to changes in the environment (e.g., changing market 
prices).
The conceptualization of the system builds on the concep-
tual framework developed by Moncada, Lukszo, Junginger, 
Faaij and Weijnen (2017), which has been used in the analysis 
of the German biodiesel supply chain (Moncada, Junginger, 
Lukszo, Faaij, & Weijnen, 2017) and the Brazilian sugarcane–
ethanol supply chain (Moncada et al., 2018). This framework 
describes a system by using concepts from complex adap-
tive systems theory and from the neo‐institutional econom-
ics school of thought. The main tenet of this framework is 
that the state of the system at macro level (macro‐behavior) 
emerges as a result of the interaction of three elements at 
micro level: the physical system, the network of actors, and 
institutions (see Figure 3).
The physical system specifies the physical objects in the 
system, such as farms, mills/distilleries, vehicles, and air-
ports. The actors are the entities that make decisions and 
perform a role in the system. In the biojet fuel supply chain, 
actors are farmers, mill/distillery owners, vehicle owners, 
and airport managers. Finally, institutions are the rules that 
structure social interaction (Brown, 2003). Examples of insti-
tutions are as follows: traditions, norms, legislation, policies, 
and governance structures.
Actors’ behavior and the interaction among actors are 
governed by institutions at different levels. At the level of 
“games,” institutions shape actors’ behavior through heu-
ristics and shared strategies that influence decision making. 
For instance, the selection of production ratios for sugar/eth-
anol/biojet fuel by mill owners is constrained by technical 
constraints and driven by profit maximization strategy. The 
level of institutional arrangements determines the interaction 
among actors. We use the CONSECANA‐SP mechanism 
to describe the interaction between farmers and mill own-
ers. We assume that the interaction between mill and vehi-
cle owners and between mills and airports is governed by a 
supply–demand mechanism. Finally, the formal institutional 
environment refers to the rules of the game. Blending man-
dates for anhydrous ethanol in gasoline and taxes levied on 
hydrous and anhydrous ethanol are examples of institutions 
at this level in the Brazilian sugarcane–ethanol supply chain.
2.3 | Modeling framework
The conceptual framework is formalized into a computa-
tional model with the aim of analyzing the influence of the 
feed‐in tariff, capital investment subsidy, and the tax levied 
on gasoline on the emergence of a biojet fuel supply from the 
existing sugarcane–ethanol supply chain. The selection of the 
model was based on the aim of the study. At the core of this 
aim is the concept of emergence. Emergence is defined as 
“the arising of novel and coherent structures, patterns, and 
properties through the interactions of multiple distributed el-
ements” (Wilensky & Rand, 2015). Agent‐based modeling 
was chosen as the modeling paradigm as, unlike approaches 
such as general equilibrium modeling, supply chain opti-
mization, and system dynamics, it enables one to describe 
a phenomenon in terms of unique and autonomous agents 
that interact with each other and the environment (Railsback 
& Grimm, 2011). Moreover, agent‐based modeling is argu-
ably the most suitable tool for modeling a complex adaptive 
system because of its bottom‐up approach and easiness of 
including different formalisms into the model (van Dam, 
Nikolic, & Lukszo, 2013).
This study builds on a spatially explicit agent‐based model 
of the Brazilian sugarcane–ethanol supply chain (Moncada 
et al., 2018). This agent‐based model uses land projections 
to explicitly account for expansion of land for sugarcane 
production in specific locations. These projections are pro-
vided by the PCRaster Land Use Change (PLUC) model 
(Verstegen, Karssenberg, van der Hilst, & Faaij, 2012). The 
F I G U R E  1  Steps of the alcohol to jet process (adapted from Ref. Barbosa Cortez, 2014)
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agent‐based model was designed using the pattern‐oriented 
approach (Grimm, 2005). The model was structured based on 
three patterns: flexibility in the production of sugar/ethanol, 
flexibility in the consumption of ethanol, and the location of 
sugarcane availability.
We extend the scope of that model by adding new actors 
(airports), new policies (feed‐in tariff and capital investment 
subsidy), new technologies (biojet fuel production), and new 
considerations into the decision making about production and 
investment in processing capacity. With regard to production, 
mill owners need to decide how to allocate the sugarcane for 
the production of sugar, ethanol, and biojet fuel. With regard 
to investment, mill owners need to assess whether to invest 
in a conventional flex plant or to invest in a flex plant that 
includes the production of biojet fuel. Below, we describe in 
more detail the features added to the model. The description 
of the agent‐based model is based on the ODD protocol pro-
posed by Grimm et al. (2006).
2.3.1 | Purpose
The aim of the model is to study the influence of supply‐side 
policies (i.e., feed‐in tariff and capital investment subsidy) on 
the emergence of a biojet fuel supply chain in Brazil.
2.3.2 | Entities, state variables, and scales
The entities in the model are the actors in the supply chain: 
farmers, mill owners, car drivers, and airport managers. The 
farmers’ main state variables are as follows: farm area, 
F I G U R E  2  System diagram of the 
Brazilian sugar/ethanol and biojet fuel 
market
F I G U R E  3  Conceptual framework. 
Elements in bold are the elements added 
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sugarcane yield, and total recoverable sugar (TRS) yield. The 
mill/distillery owners’ main state variables are as follows: 
type (flex plant, sugar plant, ethanol plant, or flex‐biojet fuel 
plant), sugarcane processing capacity, production costs, and 
production ratio of sugar, ethanol, and biojet fuel. The driv-
ers’ main state variables are as follows: vehicle type (flex 
vehicle, regular vehicle), energy demand, and preferences in 
the consumption of fuels5. The airports’ main state variables 
are as follows: total demand for jet fuel and the blending con-
straint for biojet fuel. Farmers and mills are modeled spa-
tially explicitly, whereas drivers and airports are not. This is 
because the (bio)jet fuel, E100, and gasohol prices are con-
sidered uniform over space. The global environment consists 
of the policy instruments (feed‐in tariff, capital investment 
subsidy, and gasoline tax) and the exogenous factors (annual 
world market prices of sugar and gasoline, number of flex 
and gasohol vehicles, sugar demand, sugarcane and TSR 
content yield, and price and demand of jet fuel). The tempo-
ral extent of the model is 18 years (2013–2030), and the time 
step is one year. The model is spatially explicit, covering the 
whole of Brazil. The input from PLUC to the agent‐based 
model has a resolution of 5 × 5 km.
2.3.3 | Process overview and scheduling
The process consists of a series of events that take place in 
discrete periods within a year. The process starts during the 
harvest season, where farmers harvest sugarcane, negotiate 
with the mill agents about price and quantity to be traded, 
and deliver the sugarcane to the mill as it was agreed. As the 
interaction between farmers and mill agents is bound to their 
spatial location, these transactions are decentralized and take 
place at different locations.
Mill/distillery owners store the sugarcane and maximize 
profits by deciding on volumes of sugar, hydrous ethanol, an-
hydrous ethanol, and biojet fuel to be produced (Figure 4). In 
each time period, mill/distillery owners produce sugar, etha-
nol, and/or biojet fuel and enquiry about prices and quanti-
ties of sugar and ethanol to the sugar and fuel markets. 
Drivers choose between E100 and gasohol based on relative 
prices. Airports choose between biojet fuel and fossil fuel 
based on market prices6. According to the market outlook, 
mill agents decide about the expansion of the sugarcane pro-
cessing capacity to produce either sugar/ethanol or sugar/
ethanol/biojet fuel. The new sugarcane processing capacity 
starts operation at the third year of construction. An overview 
of the model narrative and a description of some of the most 
important processes are presented in Supporting Information 
Appendix S1.
2.3.4 | Design concepts
The basic concepts underpinning the design of the agent‐based 
model are presented below. The reader is referred to Moncada 
et al. (2018) for a more comprehensive description of the con-
cepts that guide the design of the agent‐based model.
Basic principle: The basic principle applied in the model 
is the rational choice theory. This theory is used to describe 
the decision making on production of sugar, ethanol, and bio-
jet fuel.
Emergence: Emergent system dynamics includes gasohol 
and E100 prices, total production of sugar, ethanol, and biojet 
5The criterion for choosing ethanol (E100) as opposed to gasoline is the ratio 
of ethanol price to gasoline price. According to economic theory, this ratio 
should be less or equal to 0.7 as on average E100 is considered to deliver 
70% of the mileage of gasoline for the same volume of fuel. In this study, 
however, we introduce heterogeneity in the value of this ratio to account for 
that some drivers have a preference for the consumption of ethanol even 
when this fuel is not the optimal choice. 
6In reality, the individual airline companies are the ones that decide whether 
to use jet fuel or biojet fuel. Nevertheless, we aggregated the demand of 
these airlines at the airport level for modeling purposes. 
F I G U R E  4  Levels of decision as to production of sugar, hydrous, anhydrous ethanol, and biojet fuel by the owners of flex plants. This 
decision making is based on market signals
Sugarcane 
Sugar & Molasses Ethanol 
Sugar Molasses Hydrous ethanol Anhydrous ethanol 
Anhydrous ethanol Biojet fuel Hydrous ethanol 
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fuel, total demand for biojet fuel and jet fuel, and the expan-
sion of the processing capacity of sugarcane.
Adaptation: Flex mill owners and the drivers of flex vehicles 
are the entities that exhibit adaptive behavior in the model. The 
strategic behavior of drivers of flex vehicles and owners of flex 
mills is described in detail in Moncada et al. (2018). Owners of 
flex mills that also produce biojet fuel adapt their production 
ratios of ethanol/sugar/biojet fuel based on market signals (see 
Figure 4). This behavior is driven by a profit maximization strat-
egy. Thus, high prices of sugar (or ethanol or biojet fuel) lead to 
an increase in the production of sugar (or ethanol or biojet fuel).
The decision of the flex mills about the volumes of sugar, 
ethanol, and biojet fuel to be produced is modeled as an opti-
mization problem as presented below:
subject to7:
where πi is the profit derived from product i (sugar, hy-
drous, anhydrous, and biojet fuel), xs is the ratio of sugar pro-
duction to sugarcane processed (the rest is used for ethanol 
production), xh is the ratio of hydrous production to total eth-
anol production from sugarcane (the rest is used to produce 
anhydrous ethanol and biojet fuel), xhm is the ratio of hydrous 
production to total ethanol production from molasses, xbj is the 
ratio of biojet fuel production to total anhydrous ethanol pro-
duction, xsmin is the minimum in the ratio of sugar production to 
sugarcane processed, and xhmax is the maximum in the ratio of 
hydrous production to total ethanol production. Values for xsmin 
and xhmax differ among mills. To account for the influence of 
the gasoline tax on the decision making about the volumes of 
hydrous and anhydrous ethanol to be produced, it was assumed 
that xhmax is equal to one when gasoline tax is 2.46 R$/L and 
that xhmax is equal to zero when the gasoline tax is 0 R$/L. This 
assumption follows from the demand response. That is, a high 
gasoline tax will result in a major consumption of hydrous eth-
anol and thus will lead to an increase in the price of hydrous 
ethanol, which in turn will lead mill owners to increase the 
production of hydrous ethanol. A similar mechanism also ap-
plies to the effect of reducing the gasoline tax on the produc-
tion of anhydrous ethanol.
Objectives: Flex mill owners are profit‐maximizing 
agents. They aim to maximize their profits by shifting the 
production ratio of sugar to ethanol and by shifting the pro-
duction ratio of ethanol between hydrous ethanol, anhydrous 
ethanol, and biojet fuel. The production ratio of sugar to eth-
anol has to be between 35% and 65% because of a techni-
cal constraint (de Gorter, Drabik, & Just, 2015). Drivers of 
flex vehicles aim to meet their energy demand by choosing 
between gasohol and E100. Farmers aim to sell their entire 
sugarcane cultivation to the owners of flex/distillery plants at 
the price determined by the CONSECANA‐SP mechanism.
Learning/prediction: Mills forecast prices and demand 
for sugar, ethanol (hydrous and anhydrous), and biojet fuel. 
The forecasting is used to inform the decision making as to 
whether to invest in a new flex plant, to invest in a new flex 
plant with co‐production of biojet fuel, or to not invest at all.
Sensing: Farmers, owners of mills, drivers, and air-
port managers are assumed to know market prices (without 
uncertainty).
Interaction: The interaction between mills and drivers 
is mediated via the fuel market. This mechanism is de-
scribed in detail in Moncada et al. (2018). Farmers directly 
interact with owners of mills/distilleries in their neigh-
borhood through the negotiation about a contract for the 
supply of sugarcane. The main issue in the contract is the 
sugarcane price. This interaction is modeled through the 
CONSECANA‐SP mechanism. Mills interact indirectly 
with neighboring mills by competing for contracts with 
farmers in their common sourcing region in the sugarcane 
market.
In the CONSECANA‐SP mechanism, the pricing of 
sugarcane is based on two variables: the amount of total 
recoverable sugar (TRS) and the price of TRS. The TRS 
price is linked to the average market selling prices of three 
different products (sugar, hydrous, and anhydrous ethanol), 
over the period of one harvest season. The CONSECANA‐
SP model then assumes that sugarcane accounts for 59.5% 
of the production costs of sugar and accounts for 62.1% of 
ethanol production (Ferraz Dias de Moraes & Zilberman, 
2014). In this study, we introduce a modification to the cur-
rent CONSECANA‐SP mechanism to account for the pro-
duction of biojet fuel from sugarcane–ethanol. To simplify 
the analysis, this modification of the CONSECANA‐SP 
mechanism neglects the contribution of naphtha and diesel 
in the determination of the sugarcane price. Accordingly, 
(1)max






7The boundary conditions were determined based on technical constraints 
(e.g., the maximum production ratio of sugar to ethanol), model calibration 
(e.g., the minimum production ratio of sugar to ethanol and maximum pro-
duction ratio of hydrous ethanol to anhydrous ethanol (Moncada et al., 
2018), and assumptions (e.g., the production ratios of biojet fuel to anhy-
drous ethanol). 
(2)xsmin ≤ xs ≤0.65
(3)0.2≤ xh ≤ xhmax
(4)0.2≤ xhm ≤ xhmax
(5)0.1≤ xbj ≤0.8
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 are the TRS prices 
for sugar, hydrous ethanol, anhydrous ethanol, and biojet 








 are the average market sell-
ing prices for sugar, hydrous ethanol, anhydrous ethanol, and 
biojet fuel in Reais per kilogram of sugar, Reais per liter of 
ethanol, and Reais per liter of biojet fuel, respectively. scsugar, 
schydrous, and scanhydrous are the stoichiometric coefficient for 
sugar, hydrous ethanol, and anhydrous ethanol, respectively. 
yBJ−Anhydrous is the yield of biojet fuel from anhydrous 
ethanol.
The TRS price for a processing plant i is based on weigh-




 is the TRS price of the plant i in Reais per kg of TRS. 
Prsugar, Prhydrous, Pranhydrous, and Prbiojet fuel are the total produc-
tion of sugar, hydrous ethanol, anhydrous ethanol, and biojet 
fuel of the plant i, respectively, in kilograms of TRS.
Stochasticity: The model is initialized stochastically. 
Drivers’ preferences of the relative fuel prices and mills’ 
yields for sugar, hydrous ethanol, anhydrous ethanol, and 
biojet fuel are randomly assigned among the agents.
Collectives: The model neglects the formation of aggrega-
tions among individuals.
Observation: Expansion of the ethanol/sugar/biojet fuel 
production capacity, production of sugar, ethanol, and biojet 
fuel are the main key performance indicators.
Initialization: A total of 418 mill agents, 3,715 farmer 
agents, 2,500 driver agents, and 40 airport managers are ini-
tialized for the year 2013. The location of mills and their type 
(sugar plant, ethanol plant, or flex plant) are based on real 
spatial data for the year 2013 (Picoli, 2013). Tables 1 and 2 
present the parameters that describe the state of the agents at 
the start of the simulation.
Input data: The behavior of the model is driven by nine 
exogenous parameters: gasoline and sugar prices, number 
of flex and regular vehicles, productivity of both sugarcane 
and the TRS content, sugar demand, jet fuel price, and jet 
fuel demand. The productivity of both sugarcane and the 
TRS content is assumed to be constant during the period 
2013–2030. The values for sugarcane yield and TRS content 
yield are 75 t/ha and 140 kg TRS/t, respectively. These val-
ues were set out based on historical developments (UNICA, 
2017). Projections for the other parameters up to 2030 were 
retrieved from the literature (see Table 3).
The decision making about investment in processing ca-
pacity is based on the estimation of the net present value. The 
values of the parameters used in the net present value calcu-
lation are reported in Supporting Information Appendix S2. 
It is assumed that mill owners have a different perception of 
risk in their investment decision. This difference in the per-
ception of the risk was captured by using different values for 
the discount rate.
Critical assumptions that underpin the model structure are 
as follows:
• The demand for (bio) jet fuel is perfectly inelastic.
• Biojet fuel is only used in the jet fuel domestic market.
• There is no differentiation in the granting of feed‐in tariffs.
• The supply curve of jet fuel is perfectly elastic.
• If there is price parity between biojet fuel and jet fuel, air-
ports opt to first consume biojet fuel. Nevertheless, the de-
mand of biojet fuel is restricted to the maximum blending 
constraint.
2.4 | Modeling of the policies incentivizing 
production, consumption, and investment in 
biojet fuel
In this study, we use two supply‐side policies: the feed‐in 
tariff and the capital investment subsidy. A feed‐in tariff 
is a policy instrument used to accelerate investments in 
renewable energy sources. This policy instrument offers 
























































































(12)Prtotal =Prsugar +Prhydrous +Pranhydrous +Prbiojet fuel
   | 781MONCADA et Al.
energy. The payment levels can be differentiated by the 
type of technology, resources, and location so as to bet-
ter reflect production costs. In this study, we use the fixed 
feed‐in tariff, which can be considered independent of the 
market price and we neglect any differentiation in the pay-
ment levels.
Let us consider the supply of jet fuel and biojet fuel as 
shown in Figure 5. If the payment level of the feed‐in tariff is 
Pfeed‐in tariff, then the maximum supply to the fuel market is 
Qfeed‐in tariff. The government offers a payment equivalent 
to Pfeed‐in tariff to the producers that bid biojet fuel until 
Qbiojet fuel = Qfeed‐in tariff. Nevertheless, it is assumed 
that the government bids Qfeed‐in tariff to the jet fuel market 
at the same price of the fossil jet fuel Pfeed‐in tariff.
Capital investment subsidy is a supply‐side policy used to 
incentivize investment in production facilities. This policy 
instrument aims to reduce the risk aversion of investors by 
covering a percentage of the total fixed capital investment. In 
this study, we use capital investment subsidy as an instrument 
to only incentivize the production of biojet fuel. Thus, we add 
a cap in the production ratio of hydrous ethanol and a floor in 
the production ratio of biojet fuel to the plants that benefit 
from the capital investment subsidy. We assume a cap in the 
production ratio of hydrous ethanol of 0.5 (i.e., xcap
hydrous
=0.5 




3 |  RESULTS
In this section, we describe the influence of the capital invest-
ment subsidy, the feed‐in tariff, and the gasoline tax on two 
relevant aspects: the investment in sugarcane processing ca-
pacity8 and the production of hydrous ethanol, anhydrous 
ethanol, and biojet fuel. We also present the influence of the 
feed‐in tariff and capital investment subsidy on the subsidy 
costs. The results for investment in processing capacity and 
production of biofuels are presented in a matrix of 12 panels 
defined by the capital investment subsidy and the feed‐in tar-
iff. The results for the subsidy costs are presented in a matrix 
8This sugarcane processing capacity includes the production of sugar, etha-
nol, and biojet fuel. 
T A B L E  1  Farmers, vehicle users, and airport state variables and independent variables
Parameter Value Brief description Units
Farmers
Initial‐number‐farmers 3,715 initial number of farmers —
Farm‐a 2,500 farm area ha
Yield‐SC 75 yield of sugarcane per hectare t/ha
Yield‐TRS 140 yield of total recoverable sugar per ton of sugarcane kg/t
Drivers
Type gasohol; flex —
Demand 47,244 energy demand per vehicle MJ/year
Preference‐relative‐pricea N (0.9, 0.1) value in the relative price that determines the consumption pattern of 
the driver i. Values of the relative price higher than the individual 
relative price lead to consumption of gasohol by the driver
—
Airports
Total‐demand‐jet‐fuel N.A total demand of jet fuel. This demand can be either satisfied with jet 
fuel or partially satisfied with renewable jet fuel. This parameter 
depends on the projections for domestic demand of jet fuel in Brazil
Ml/year
Blending constraintb 30 Blending constraint of biojet fuel %
Independent variables
Blend‐mandatec 23 blend mandate %
Tax‐gasolinec 1.23 tax levied on gasoline R$/L
Tax‐hydrousc 0.30 tax levied on hydrous ethanol R$/L
Tax‐anhydrousc 0.05 tax levied on anhydrous ethanol R$/L
Feed‐in‐tariff [3–6] feed‐in tariff for biojet fuel production R$/L
Capital‐investment‐subsidy [0–20] governmental financial aid that covers a share of the total depreciable 
capital required to build a biojet fuel plant
%
aThe values in bold were obtained from the model calibration (see Moncada et al., 2018). bThe blending constraint of 30% is only valid for the biojet fuel produced from 
ethanol. cThese values were retrieved from de Gorter, Drabik, Kliauga, & Timilsina (2013). 
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of four panels defined by the capital investment subsidy and 
the feed‐in tariff. The gasoline tax or the type of biofuels is 
presented by different colors in each panel. The results pre-
sented below correspond to a tax levied on hydrous and anhy-
drous ethanol of 0.3 R$/L and 0.05 R$/L, respectively.
Figure 6 shows the evolution of sugarcane processing ca-
pacity. There is a threshold in the investment in processing 
capacity: No investment, and thus no production of biojet 
fuel, takes place at a feed‐in tariff of 3 R$/L. If the feed‐in 
tariff is increased above 3 R$/L, there is an increase in invest-
ment in processing capacity. Nevertheless, the expansion of 
the processing capacity is almost brought to a halt in the year 
2020 if the feed‐in tariff is 4 R$/L. As an illustration, when 
comparing the scenarios with a capital investment subsidy of 
20%, a feed‐in tariff of 4 R$/L, and a gasoline tax of 0, 1.23, 
and 2.46 R$/L, the sugarcane processing capacity is 165, 93, 
0 million tons in 2020, whereas it is 208, 93, and 0 million 
tons in 2030, respectively. If the feed‐in tariff is 6 R$/L and 
the tax levied on gasoline is equal or less than 1.23 R$/L, the 
expansion in processing capacity also evolves nonlinearly. 
For instance, in the period 2020–2025, for a feed‐in tariff of 
6 R$/L and a capital investment of 20%, the investment in 
processing capacity grows 16.9% and 14.5% if the gasoline 
tax is 0 R$/L and 1.23 R$/L, respectively. This threshold is 
due to that values of the feed‐in tariff below 4 R$/L are un-
able to outweigh the biojet fuel production costs.
The effect of the gasoline tax on the investment in sugar-
cane processing capacity hinges on the feed‐in tariff. As the 
feed‐in tariff increases, the effect of the gasoline tax on the 
investment in processing capacity increases too. For instance, 
when comparing the scenarios with a gasoline tax of 0 R$/L, 
a capital investment subsidy of 20%, a feed‐in tariff of 6 and 
5 R$/L, the processing capacity is 1,100 instead of 1,000 in 
2025. Tax‐free gasoline leads to increased investment in pro-
cessing capacity. A reduction in the gasoline tax, at a high 
feed‐in tariff, results in an increased investment in production 
capacity because in this tax regime, the demand for anhydrous 
ethanol increases. This increase in the demand for anhydrous 
ethanol leads to an increase in its price. The combination of 
high prices for anhydrous ethanol and high prices for biojet 
fuel (i.e., feed‐in tariff) provides the right signals to investors. 
On the other hand, the effect of the capital investment on the 
investment in processing capacity is marginal.
A tax‐free gasoline regime favors the production of an-
hydrous ethanol over hydrous ethanol and biojet fuel (see 
Figure 7). This pattern in the production of anhydrous eth-
anol is due to the assumption that owners of flex plants will 
only produce anhydrous ethanol if the gasoline tax decreases 
T A B L E  2  Mill state variables
Parameter Value Brief description Units
Mills
Number‐sugar‐mill‐plants 10 number of the sugar plants —
Number‐ethanol‐mill‐plants 83 number of ethanol plants —
Initial‐number‐flex‐mill‐plants 325 number of the mill plants —
Proc‐capacitya [1, 5] processing capacity of sugarcane Mt SC
Yield‐sugar‐SCb U (119, 146) yield of sugar per ton of sugarcane kg/t
Yield‐hydrous‐SCb U (83, 92) yield of hydrous ethanol per ton of sugarcane L/t
Yield‐anhydrous‐SCb U(79, 88) yield of anhydrous ethanol per ton of sugarcane L/t
Yield‐biojet‐fuel‐SCc U (35,42) yield of biojet fuel per ton of sugarcane L/t
Yield‐ethanol‐molasses U (8, 10) yield of ethanol from molasses per ton of sugarcane L/t
Sugar‐proc‐cost U(41, 51) processing cost of sugar per ton of sugarcane R$/t
Hydrous‐proc‐cost U (14, 17) processing cost of hydrous ethanol per ton of sugarcane R$/t
Anhydrous‐proc‐cost U (25, 31) processing cost of anhydrous ethanol per ton of sugarcane R$/t
RJF‐proc‐cost U (18, 23) processing cost of biojet fuel per ton of sugarcane R$/t
Prod‐ratio‐sugarc U (0.5, 0.6) proportion of sugarcane that is used to produce sugar —
Prod‐ratio‐hydrousc U (0.2, 0.5) proportion of sugarcane that is used to produce hydrous ethanol —
Prod‐ratio‐biojet‐fuel U (0.2–0.8) proportion of sugarcane that is used to produce biojet fuel —
Prod‐ratio‐hydrous‐molasses U (0.2, 0.5) proportion of ethanol produced from molasses that is used to 
produce hydrous ethanol
—
The values in bold were obtained from the model calibration (Moncada et al., 2018).
aThe distribution of the production capacity was based on Valdes (2011). bIt is assumed that the differences in the yields are due to differences in industrial efficiencies 
between mills and distilleries. cRetrieved from Santos, Mussatto, Osseweijer, van derWielen & Posada (2018). 
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to 0 R$/L. An increase in the feed‐in tariff (above 3 R$/L) 
leads to an increase in the production of hydrous ethanol and 
biojet fuel. When comparing the scenarios with a capital in-
vestment of 10% and feed‐in tariff 5 and 4 R$/L, the biojet 
fuel production is 2,700 instead of 1,000 Ml and the produc-
tion of hydrous ethanol is 10,000 Ml instead of 6,000 Ml in 
2025. Also, the effect of the capital investment subsidy on 
the production of biofuels depends on the feed‐in tariff. At 
values of the feed‐in tariff above 4 R$/L, an increase in the 
capital investment subsidy leads to an increase in the produc-
tion of hydrous ethanol and to a decrease in the production of 
both biojet fuel and anhydrous ethanol. For instance, when 
comparing the scenarios with a feed‐in tariff of 5 R$/L and 
capital investment of 0 and 10%, the production of hydrous 
ethanol is 4,000 instead of 8,000 Ml, the production of biojet 
is 1800 instead of 1700 Ml, and the production of anhydrous 
ethanol is 25,000 instead of 21,000 Ml in 2020. This increase 
in the production of hydrous ethanol is due to the constraints 
in the production of hydrous ethanol and biojet fuel imposed 
on the plants that benefit from the capital investment subsidy. 
The mandate of producing a certain minimum of biojet fuel 
led to an optimal distribution of the production ratios that 
favor the production of hydrous ethanol. A further increase in 
the capital investment subsidy did not change the production 
patterns of hydrous and anhydrous ethanol and biojet fuel. 
This is due to that the constraints in the production of hydrous 
ethanol and biojet fuel are assumed to be independent of the 
level of the capital investment subsidy. That is, the obliga-
tions imposed to the plants that received a subsidy of 10% are 
equal to the obligations imposed to the plants that received a 
subsidy of 20%.
As shown in Figure 8, there is an oscillating behavior in 
the production of hydrous and anhydrous ethanol if the tax 
levied on gasoline is 1.23 R$/L. This behavior is the result 
of both the fuel choice of owners of flex vehicles that shifts 
between two states (i.e., consumption of either gasohol or hy-
drous ethanol) and the myopic behavior of the owners of the 
mills as to production of ethanol. This gasoline tax regime fa-
vors the production of anhydrous ethanol rather than hydrous 
ethanol. There is production of biojet fuel only if the feed‐in 
F I G U R E  5  Hypothetical supply 




F I G U R E  6  Sugarcane processing 
capacity of mills that include the production 
of biojet fuel for different combinations 
of the capital investment subsidy, feed‐in 
tariff, and tax levied on gasoline. Capital 
investment subsidy as a percentage of the 
total depreciable capital for investment in a 
biojet fuel plant. Feed‐in tariff and gasoline 
tax in R$/L. Blend mandate = 23%v/v, 
hydrous tax = 0.3 R$/L, and anhydrous 
tax = 0.05 R$/L
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tariff is equal to or greater than 4 R$/L. The year of initial 
production of biojet fuel depends on the feed‐in tariff. The 
supply chain starts producing biojet fuel in 2018 and 2020 if 
the feed‐in tariff is 4 and 6 R$/L, respectively. There is an os-
cillating behavior in the production of biojet fuel if the feed‐
in tariff is greater than or equal to 5 R$/L. At a feed‐in tariff 
of 5 R$/L, the production of biojet fuel oscillates between 
800 and 2000 millions of liters, whereas at a feed‐in tariff of 
6 R$/L, the production of biojet fuel oscillates between 2000 
and 3,000 millions of liters. This oscillating behavior is also 
caused by the interaction of decision making between own-
ers of flex vehicles and owners of mills about consumption 
of fuels and production of ethanol, respectively. In reality, 
this fast oscillation is unlikely to happen because actors adapt 
their behavior gradually. Nevertheless, the impact of this de-
viation of reality on the conclusions is negligible because this 
study focuses its analysis on extreme values in the gasoline 
tax (i.e., 0 and 2.46 R$/L). At these values of the gasoline tax, 
decisions about the production and consumption of ethanol 
converge to one state (Figure 7 and Figure 9).
Figure 9 presents the evolution of the production of biojet 
fuel, hydrous, and anhydrous ethanol when the tax levied on 
gasoline is 2.46 R$/L. These conditions favor the production 
of hydrous ethanol rather than anhydrous ethanol. Unlike the 
previous case when the gasoline tax is 1.23 R$/L, biojet fuel 
is only produced at a feed‐in tariff equal to or greater than 5 
R$/L and a capital investment subsidy equal or greater than 
10%. For instance, when comparing scenarios with a gaso-
line tax of 2.46 R$/L, a capital investment subsidy of 20% 
and a feed‐in tariff of 6 and 5 R$/L, the production of biojet 
fuel is 1600 instead of 230 Ml in 2025. With regard to the 
production of hydrous and anhydrous ethanol, at a capital in-
vestment of 20% and a feed‐in tariff of 6 R$/L, the production 
of hydrous ethanol stays approximately constant at a value of 
30,000 million liters as of 2020, whereas the production of 
anhydrous ethanol grows approximately 8% per year in the 
period 2025–2030. This behavior in biofuels production is 
due to the constraints in the production of hydrous ethanol 
and biojet fuel imposed on the plants that benefit from the 
capital investment subsidy. In this case, the cap imposed in 
the production of hydrous ethanol favors the production of 
anhydrous ethanol and biojet fuel. The large standard devi-
ations in the production of hydrous and anhydrous ethanol 
in 2024, 2025, and 2026 show that, although the surge in the 
production of hydrous ethanol is always present, its exact 
timing differs between these 3 years over the model runs.
Figure 10 presents the trade‐offs between the production 
of hydrous ethanol and biojet fuel in the year 2030. Patterns in 
biojet fuel production in 2030 hinge on the interaction of gas-
oline tax, capital investment subsidy, and the feed‐in tariff. In 
a tax‐free gasoline regime, an increase in the feed‐in tariff re-
sults in an increase in the production of biojet fuel. The effect 
of the capital investment subsidy on the production of biojet 
fuel is characterized by a threshold. Excepting for the regime 
of free‐tax gasoline in combination with high feed‐in tariffs, 
the production of biojet fuel increases when the capital in-
vestment subsidy is higher than zero. Nevertheless, a further 
increase in the capital investment subsidy does not further 
incentivize the production of biojet fuel. This is due to the 
assumption that the constraints in the production of hydrous 
ethanol and the mandates in the production of biojet fuel are 
independent of the level of the capital investment subsidy. In 
this regime (i.e. free gasoline tax in combination with a cap-
ital investment subsidy higher than zero), an increase in the 
feed‐in tariff favors the production of both hydrous ethanol 
and biojet fuel.
At a tax level of gasoline of 1.23 R$/L, the production 
of biojet fuel in 2030 increases with an increase in the feed‐
in tariff. At this level of the gasoline tax, no trade‐offs exist 
between production of hydrous ethanol and biojet fuel: An 
increase in the feed‐in tariff leads to higher production of 
biojet fuel without compromising the production of hydrous 
F I G U R E  7  Production of hydrous 
ethanol, anhydrous ethanol, and biojet 
fuel for different combinations of the 
capital investment subsidy and feed‐in 
tariff. Capital investment subsidy as a 
percentage of the total depreciable capital 
for investment in a biojet fuel plant. Feed‐in 
tariff in R$/L. Gasoline tax = 0 R$/L, blend 
mandate = 23%v/v, hydrous tax = 0.3 R$/L, 
and anhydrous tax = 0.05 R$/L
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ethanol. The effect of the capital investment subsidy on the 
production of biojet fuel is similar to the one described for the 
tax‐free gasoline regime.
At a tax level of gasoline of 2.46 R$/L, the production of 
biojet fuel in 2030 increases with an increase in the feed‐in 
tariff if the capital investment subsidy is greater than or equal 
to 10%. At this level of taxation on gasoline, the effect of the 
capital investment subsidy on the production of biojet fuel is 
characterized by a threshold. In this regime, the production 
of biojet fuel only increases when the capital investment sub-
sidy is higher than zero. This regime is also characterized by 
a trade‐off between the production of hydrous ethanol and 
biojet fuel. At a capital investment greater than 0%, feed‐in 
tariffs below 6 R$/L lead to largely the production of hydrous 
ethanol, whereas a feed‐in tariff of 6 R$/L leads to an in-
crease in the production of biojet fuel and to a decrease in the 
production of hydrous ethanol.
All in all, for a feed‐in tariff above 4 R$/L, the gasoline 
tax exhibits an inversely correlated effect on the production 
of biojet fuel. That is, the higher the gasoline tax, the lower 
the biojet fuel production. This is due to that a high gasoline 
tax results in an increase in the demand and thus in an in-
crease in the price of hydrous ethanol. These conditions favor 
the production of hydrous ethanol. Nevertheless, provided 
that there are mechanisms that ensue the production of biojet 
fuel as in this case the capital investment subsidy, the produc-
tion of biojet fuel (1800 Ml) in 2030 at a gasoline tax rate of 
2.46 R$/L is sufficient to satisfy the domestic demand of jet 
fuel (4,000 Ml) in 2030 because of the blend wall, defined as 
blending biojet fuel into jet fuel at 30%.
The cost of subsidizing the emergence of a biojet fuel 
supply chain under different combination of the capital in-
vestment subsidy and feed‐in tariffs at a gasoline tax rate of 
2.46 R$/L is presented in Figure 11. The most significant 
contribution in costs to spur biojet fuel production comes 
from a feed‐in tariff of 6 R$/L with a cost of approximately 
9,000 MR$ per year as of 2020. The contribution of the cap-
ital investment subsidy is notably in 2016 with a value of 
F I G U R E  8  Production of hydrous 
ethanol, anhydrous ethanol, and biojet 
fuel for different combinations of the 
capital investment subsidy and feed‐in 
tariff. Capital investment subsidy as a 
percentage of the total depreciable capital 
for investment in a biojet fuel plant. Feed‐in 
tariff in R$/L. Gasoline tax = 1.23 R$/L, 
blend mandate = 23%v/v, hydrous tax = 0.3 
R$/L, and anhydrous tax = 0.05 R$/L






































F I G U R E  9  Production of hydrous 
ethanol, anhydrous ethanol, and biojet 
fuel for different combinations of the 
capital investment subsidy and feed‐in 
tariff. Capital investment subsidy as a 
percentage of the total depreciable capital 
for investment in a biojet fuel plant. Feed‐in 
tariff in R$/L. Gasoline tax = 2.46 R$/L, 
blend mandate = 23%v/v, hydrous tax = 0.3 
R$/L, and anhydrous tax = 0.05 R$/L
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approximately 1,500 MR$. The general subsidy cost pattern 
is characterized by the early introduction of the capital in-
vestment subsidy followed by a cost regime dominated by the 
feed‐in tariff.
4 |  DISCUSSION
The results suggest that the emergence of a Brazilian biojet 
fuel supply chain, from the existing sugarcane–ethanol sup-
ply chain, is largely driven by a tax‐free gasoline regime and 
a feed‐in tariff greater than 3 R$/L (see Figures 6 and 10), 
provided that the policy landscape for both road transport 
and aviation sector remains stable, that the demand for (bio)
jet fuel is perfectly inelastic, that there is no differentiation 
between the type of technologies, resources, and location in 
the granting of feed‐in tariffs, and that the effect of import 
and export tariffs on the market is negligible. We also found 
that the effect of the capital investment subsidy on sugarcane 
processing capacity is negligible. These findings are in line 
with the reported by Del Rio & Bleda who point out the ad-
vantages of feed‐in tariff to lower risks in renewable energy 
investment (del Río & Bleda, 2012).
The results also suggest that the production patterns of 
biojet fuel are heavily influenced by the gasoline tax (see 
Figures 7‒9). A tax‐free gasoline regime favors the produc-
tion of biojet fuel even when the capital investment subsidy 
is zero, that is, even in situations where the constraint for 
hydrous production and the mandate for biojet fuel pro-
duction imposed on the plants that receive the capital in-
vestment subsidy were absent. Unlike the tax‐free gasoline 
regime, an increase in the level of taxation of gasoline re-
quires mandates for the production of biojet fuel to ensure 
its production. Whilst changes in the values assumed for 
the cap and floor in the production ratio of hydrous ethanol 
and biojet fuel, respectively, will bring about different ab-
solute production quantities for the three fuels, the produc-
tion patterns of biojet fuel will remain qualitatively similar.
We found that there is a trade‐off between the production 
of hydrous ethanol and biojet fuel in 2030 at high levels of tax-
ation of gasoline (see Figure 10). This insight may be relevant 
for a Brazilian government that strives for the decarbonization 
of both the road transport sector and the aviation sector. If the 
sugarcane–ethanol supply chain is used to support the emer-
gence of a biojet fuel supply chain, our results suggest that in-
creasing the level of gasoline taxation, introducing regulations 
in the production of biojet fuel through mechanisms as the cap-
ital investment subsidy, and a feed‐in tariff of 6 R$/L increase 
the production of hydrous ethanol without compromising the 
production of biojet fuel. In fact, the biojet fuel produced at a 
gasoline tax rate of 2.46 R$/L, a capital investment subsidy of 
10%, and a feed‐in tariff of 6 R$/L is sufficient to satisfy 30% 
of the domestic demand (blend wall). Our results also suggest 
that the feed‐in tariff has the most significant contribution in 
the costs to spur biojet fuel production (see Figure 11).
Biojet fuel is considered a cornerstone in the strategy to 
achieve the GHG emissions reduction targets9 of the aviation 
sector. Spurring the production and consumption of biofuels 
requires specific policies at the national level and international 
level. At the national level, we showed in this study what pol-
icy instruments are necessary to enable the emergence of a 
biojet fuel supply chain from the existing sugarcane–ethanol 
supply chain. At the international level, government, industry, 
and civil society representatives reached an agreement on a 
global market‐based measure (GMBM) to reduce aviation car-
bon emissions through offsetting. Nevertheless, it is unclear 
whether this market mechanism will drive the development of 
biojet fuel supply chains. The model developed in this study 
could be coupled with models developed to describe other 
biomass and biofuels markets in different geographies via a 
multimodel ecology framework10 (Bollinger, Nikolić, Davis, 
& Dijkema, 2015). Therefore, we can account for the inher-
ently international nature of the aviation sector and provide 
insights as to the effect of market mechanisms on the deploy-
ment of biojet fuel supply chains.
9The Air Transport Action Group (ATAG) has established goals to reach 
carbon neutral growth from 2020 and reduce net carbon dioxide emissions 
by 50% (relative to 2005 levels) by 2050. 
10Multimodel ecology is defined as “an interacting group of models coevolv-
ing with one another in a dynamic sociotechnical environment” (Bollinger et 
al., 2015). 
F I G U R E  1 0  Production of hydrous 
ethanol and biojet fuel in 2030 for different 
combination of capital investment subsidy, 
feed‐in tariff, and gasoline tax. Capital 
investment subsidy as a percentage of the 
total depreciable capital for investment in a 
biojet fuel plant. Feed‐in tariff and gasoline 
tax in R$/L. Blend mandate = 23%v/v, 
hydrous tax = 0.3 R$/L, and anhydrous 
tax = 0.05 R$/L
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Our study applies a number of key enhancements to the 
exploration of the emergence of a biojet fuel supply chain. 
First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that 
provides insights into how different policy instruments may 
steer the emergence of a biojet fuel supply chain. Previous 
analyses are qualitative and thus only offer a description of 
the phenomenon of emergence, not a quantification (Nair & 
Paulose, 2014). Second, this is the first work that shows how 
the sugarcane–ethanol supply chain can be used as a platform 
for the emergence of a biojet fuel supply chain.
Our study also applies a number of key enhancements 
to the agent‐based modeling of the Brazilian ethanol sup-
ply chain (Moncada et al. (2018). First, it modifies the 
CONSECANA‐SP mechanism to account for the production 
of biojet fuel. Second, it adds the option of investing in biojet 
fuel production. Finally, it incorporates the feed‐in tariff and 
the capital investment subsidy into the analysis.
From the methodological viewpoint, we have shown how 
a modeler can use the conceptual framework developed by 
Moncada, Lukszo et al. (2017) and the ODD protocol to 
build an agent‐based model to explore the emergence of a 
biojet fuel supply chain. The advantage of using the concep-
tual framework is that offers a systematic method to iden-
tify social processes, theories and structures that underlie the 
model's design. That is, the conceptual framework identifies 
the elements that one needs to consider for the modeling of 
a biofuel supply chain, such as actors’ decision making and 
interaction, social structures, and the effect of policies on 
actors’ behavior. This is considered useful in the light that 
current biomass/biofuels markets models neglect the effect of 
social processes, differences between individual actors, and 
social structures on the evolution of the system. As we have 
shown in this study, these processes play an important role in 
the emergence of a biojet fuel supply chain.
This approach, however, does have some limitations. First, 
we limit our analysis to the use of supply‐side policies granted by 
the Brazilian government. We neglect the introduction of any 
market mechanism11 to stimulate the production of biojet fuel 
driven by the goal to improve the greenhouse gas emissions per-
formance. These market mechanisms may become relevant to 
the decarbonization of the aviation industry as this sector is in-
herently international. Second, given the scope of this study, we 
neglect the interaction of the production of biojet fuel by the al-
cohol‐to‐jet fuel pathway with other potential production routes 
(e.g., hydroprocessed esters and fatty acids (HEFA), direct fer-
mentation sugars to hydrocarbons (DFJ), biomass gasification, 
and Fischer–Tropsch syngas to jet (GFT)). Indeed, the emer-
gence of biojet fuel supply chains is largely the result of both the 
collaboration among the stakeholders in the supply chain and the 
competition for resources with actors who use different technol-
ogies or with actors in other sectors. Third, we neglect the con-
tribution of co‐products in biojet fuel production (i.e., diesel and 
naphtha) in the determination of sugarcane price through the 
CONSECANA‐SP mechanism. Discussions among farmers, 
sugar/ethanol producers, and potential biojet fuel producers, on 
how to account for the influence of biojet fuel production and 
co‐products in the pricing of sugarcane, may hinder or speed up 
the development of the biojet fuel supply chain in Brazil. Fourth, 
we neglect the effect of the electricity market (i.e., electricity 
prices) on the producers’ decision making as to production of 
sugar, ethanol, and biojet fuel. Finally, we neglect the competi-
tion for ethanol between the road transport sector and emergent 
independent biojet fuel producers12, which may have an impact 
11A market mechanism refers to the process whereby the market solves re-
source allocation problems. 
12Independent biojet fuel producers are the actors that only produce biojet 
fuel. 
F I G U R E  1 1  Evolution of the subsidy 
cost to spur the emergence of a biojet 
fuel supply chain at a gasoline tax rate of 
2.46R$/L. Capital investment subsidy as a 
percentage of the total depreciable capital 
for investment in a biojet fuel plant. Feed‐in 
tariff and gasoline tax in R$/L
capitalInvestmentSubsidy: 10 capitalInvestmentSubsidy: 20
FeedinTariff: 5
FeedinTariff: 6
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on ethanol prices and ethanol production and consumption 
patterns.
Yet, this study provides new insights into the emergence 
of a Brazilian biojet fuel supply chain under different policy 
landscapes. A further step would be to incorporate the ongo-
ing discussion about the biofuel policy in Brazil into the anal-
ysis, namely the creation of a market mechanism that aims for 
the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by rewarding the 
production of cleaner biofuels.
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